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Two-way quantum cryptography at different wavelengths
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We study the security of two-way quantum cryptography at different wavelengths of the electromagnetic
spectrum, from the optical range down to the microwave range. In particular, we consider a two-way quantum
communication protocol where Gaussian-modulated thermal states are subject to random Gaussian displace-
ments and finally homodyned. We show how its security threshold (in reverse reconciliation) is extremely
robust with respect to the preparation noise and able to outperform the security thresholds of one-way protocols
at any wavelength. As a result, improved security distances are now accessible for implementing quantum key
distribution at the very challenging regime of infrared frequencies.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.-p, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (QKD) [1]
allows the secure distribution of a secret message between
two authenticated parties, Alice and Bob, using nothing more
than standard optical equipment, such as off-the-shelf lasers
and homodyne detectors [2]. Although being conceived
and developed many years after the original discrete-variable
schemes [3], continuous-variable (CV) QKD has seen many
advances and milestones over the years, both theoretical and
experimental [1, 2]. More recent advances include, the secu-
rity against general attacks in the finite-size regime [4], analy-
sis of practical imperfections [5], as well as the role of noise-
less amplification [6–8] and an experimental demonstration
over 80 km of optical fiber [9].
From a practical point of view, there has been recent in-
terest in thermal QKD [10–13] which essentially considers
the realistic effect of unknown preparation noise on Alice’s
signal states. One of the applications of thermal QKD is the
ability to generate secure keys at different wavelengths of the
electromagnetic field [12, 13], from optical range down to
the infrared and microwave regimes. Secure communication
at different wavelengths is ubiquitous in today’s communica-
tion environment. From the optical telecommunication wave-
length of 1550 nm down into the GHz microwave regime, uti-
lized by technologies such as Wi-Fi and cellular phones.
In this paper, we show how to improve the security of ther-
mal QKD at different wavelengths, using two-way quantum
communication, a scheme which is already known to tolerate
higher levels of loss and noise [14]. Variants of the two-way
quantum communication protocol also exists [15, 16]. The
idea of using additional preparation noise for two-way quan-
tum communication was preliminarily investigated in [17].
Here they showed the ‘fighting noise with noise’ effect, an
effect first seen in discrete-variable QKD [18] and later in CV
one-way protocols [19–21]. Essentially what it shows is that
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if extra noise is added in the appropriate way, then the perfor-
mance of the protocol can be improved, in terms of secret-key
rate and security threshold [1]. In our paper we go further than
this initial analysis by showing the security of the two-way
protocol in the presence of considerably large levels of prepa-
ration noise, corresponding to the use of different communi-
cation wavelengths. We show that two-way QKD is extremely
robust in reverse reconciliation, such as to beat one-way pro-
tocols for any value of the preparation noise, a feature which
allows us to improve the performance of QKD at the infrared
regime.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we introduce
one-way thermal QKD and how this basic setup can be ex-
tended to two-way quantum communication. Then, in Sec III,
we analyze the security of the two-way thermal QKD pro-
tocol by deriving its secret-key rates in direct reconciliation
(Sec. III.A) and reverse reconciliation (Sec. III.B). In Section
IV, we study the performance of the two-way thermal pro-
tocol at different electromagnetic wavelengths (in particular,
infrared), showing its superiority over one-way thermal QKD.
Finally, Sec. V is used for the conclusion.
II. THERMAL QKD: FROM ONE-WAY TO TWO-WAY
QUANTUM COMMUNICATION
A. One-way thermal QKD
A thermal QKD protocol begins with the sender, Alice, ran-
domly displacing thermal states in the phase space according
to a bivariate Gaussian distribution. These modulated thermal
states are sent to the receiver, Bob, over an insecure quan-
tum channel which is monitored by the eavesdropper, Eve (see
Fig. 1). On average, the generic quadrature Aˆ of Alice’s input
mode A can be written as Aˆ = 0ˆ + a, where the real number
a is the Gaussian encoding variable with variance Va, and 0ˆ
is a quadrature operator accounting for the thermal ‘prepara-
tion noise’, with variance V0 ≥ 1 (see Ref. [22] for details on
our notation). The overall variance of Alice’s average state is
therefore given by VA = V0 + Va.
The variance V0 can be broken down as V0 = 1+η, where 1
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FIG. 1: One-way thermal QKD protocol. See text for details.
is the variance of the vacuum noise, and η ≥ 0 is the variance
of an extra noise which is confined in Alice’s station and not
known to either Eve, Alice or Bob. At the output of the chan-
nel, Bob homodynes the incoming mode B, randomly switch-
ing between position and momentum detections (note that an
alternative no-switching protocol based on heterodyne detec-
tion can also be considered [23]. In this way, Bob collects an
output variable b which is correlated to Alice’s encoding a.
By making use of a public classical channel, Bob reveals his
basis choices and compares a subset of his data with Alice in
order to estimate the noise in the channel and, therefore, the
maximum information stolen by Eve. If the noise is not too
high, compared to a security threshold, Alice and Bob apply
classical post-processing procedures of error correction and
privacy amplification in order to extract a shared secret-key.
In particular, in standard CV-QKD we consider post-
processing procedures based on one-way classical communi-
cation, which can be forward from Alice to Bob, also known
as direct reconciliation (DR) [24]), or backward from Bob to
Alice, also known as reverse reconciliation (RR) [25]). In DR,
Bob aims to guess Alice’s encoding a with the help of clas-
sical communication from her, while in RR it is Alice who
aims to guess Bob’s decoding b with the help of classical com-
munication from him. Despite Alice and Bob’s mutual infor-
mation not depending on the direction of the reconciliation,
Eve’s stolen information does. For this reason, there are two
different secret-key rates defined for the two different types of
reconciliation.
Since the above thermal protocol is a Gaussian proto-
col [1], its security can be tested against collective Gaussian
attacks [26, 27], being proven the most powerful attacks al-
lowed by quantum physics, given a suitable symmetrization
of the protocols [28]. Collective Gaussian attacks can be char-
acterized and classified in various canonical forms [29], of
which the most important for practical purposes is represented
by the entangling cloner collective attack [30]. Such an attack
consists in Eve interacting an ancilla mode E with the sig-
nal mode A by means of a beam splitter with transmission
T ∈ [0, 1]. The ancilla mode is part of an Einstein-Podolski-
Rosen (EPR) state ρEE′′ [31], which is an entangled Gaussian
state with zero mean and covariance matrix (CM)
VEE′′ =
(
W I
√
W 2 − 1Z√
W 2 − 1Z W I
)
, (1)
where W ≥ 1, I = diag(1, 1) and Z = diag(1,−1). Both
the kept mode E′′ and the transmitted mode E′ are collected
in a quantum memory (QM) which is coherently measured at
the end of the protocol.
In a collective entangling-cloner attack, Eve’s stolen infor-
mation can be over-estimated using the Holevo bound [32]. In
particular, we have to consider two Holevo quantities I(E : a)
or I(E : b) depending if Eve attacks Alice’s variable (DR) or
Bob’s variable (RR). Subtracting these quantities from Alice
and Bob’s classical mutual information I(a : b), we get the
two secret-key rates of the protocolR◮ = I(a : b)− I(E : a)
and R◭ = I(a : b) − I(E : b), for DR and RR, respec-
tively. For a thermal QKD protocol based on modulated ther-
mal states and homodyne detection, these key rates are func-
tions of the input parameters, namely the variance of the ther-
mal noise V0 and the variance of the classical signal mod-
ulation Va, plus the parameters of the attack, which are the
transmission T of the channel and its thermal variance W .
In the typical limit of high modulation (Va ≫ 1), we get the
two analytical expressions for the asymptotic secret-key rates
R◮(V0, T,W ) =
1
2
log
TΛ(W,V0)
(1− T )Λ(V0,W )
+ h
[√
WΛ(1,WV0)
Λ(W,V0)
]
− h(W ) , (2)
and
R◭(V0, T,W ) =
1
2
log
W
(1− T )Λ(V0,W ) − h(W ), (3)
where we have used the two functions
Λ(x, y) := Tx+ (1− T )y , (4)
and
h(x) :=
(x+ 1
2
)
log
(x+ 1
2
)
−
(x− 1
2
)
log
(x− 1
2
)
.
(5)
(See Appendix A for details on their derivation.) By setting
these key rates to zero, we can derive the two security thresh-
olds W◮ = W◮(V0, T ) and W◭ = W◭(V0, T ) in DR and
RR, respectively. Equivalently, these security thresholds can
be given in terms of tolerable excess noise N◮ = N◮(V0, T )
and N◭ = N◭(V0, T ), where N := (W − 1)(1− T )T−1.
Note that other types of one-way thermal protocols may be
considered, e.g., using heterodyne detection instead of homo-
dyne at the output [13]. However, the corresponding security
thresholds,N◮ andN◭, are numerically very similar to those
of the one-way protocol just described, which can be consid-
ered as the most representative and practical candidate of one-
way thermal QKD.
B. Two-way thermal QKD
The scenario of Fig. 1 can be readily extended to two-way
quantum communication [14]. As depicted in Fig. 2, Bob
has an input mode B1 where a thermal state with preparation
variance V0 is modulated by a bivariate Gaussian distribution
with signal variance Vb1 := µ. On average, we have the input
quadrature Bˆ1 = 0ˆ+b1, encoding the Gaussian variable b1. In
3the first quantum communication through the insecure chan-
nel, mode B1 is sent to Alice, who receives the noisy mode
A1 and randomly switches between two configurations [14]:
(i) ON configuration, where Alice encodes a Gaussian vari-
able a with variance Va = µ, randomly displacing the
quadrature of the incoming mode Aˆ1 → Aˆ2 = Aˆ1 + a;
(ii) OFF configuration, where Alice homodynes the incoming
mode A1 with classical output a1, and prepares another
Gaussian-modulated thermal state Aˆ2 = 0ˆ + a2, with
the same preparation and signal variances as Bob, i.e.,
V0 and Va2 = µ.
In both cases, the processed mode A2 is sent back to Bob
in the second quantum communication through the channel.
At the output, Bob homodynes the incoming mode B2 with
classical output b2.
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FIG. 2: Two-way thermal QKD protocol. See text for explanations.
A collective entangling-cloner attack is also shown, where Eve uses
two beam splitters with transmission T and two EPR states with vari-
ance W . The output modes E′1, E′′1 , E′2, E′′2 are collected in a quan-
tum memory which is coherently measured at the end of the protocol.
At the end of the double quantum communication, the two
parties exploit a public channel to classically communicate.
Alice reveals which configuration, ON and OFF, was chosen
in each round of the protocol, and both the parties declare
which quadratures were detected by their homodyne detec-
tors. After this stage, Alice and Bob possess a set of correlated
variables, which are a1 ≈ b1 and a2 ≈ b2 in OFF configura-
tion, and a ≈ b in ON configuration, where b is post-processed
from b1 and b2.
By comparing a small subset of values of these variables,
Alice and Bob can understand which kind of attack has been
performed against the two-way protocol. In particular, the two
parties are able to detect the presence of memory between
the first and the second use of the channel. If a memory is
present (two-mode coherent attack), then Alice and Bob use
the OFF configuration, extracting a secret-key from a1 ≈ b1
and a2 ≈ b2. By contrast, if the memory is absent (one-
mode collective attack), then they use the ON configuration
and they post-process a and b. In other words, the switch-
ing between the two configurations is used as a virtual basis
against Eve [14]. Once Alice and Bob have decided which
configuration to use, they post-process their remaining data
using standard one-way algorithms of classical error correc-
tion and privacy amplification, therefore extracting a secret-
key in direct or reverse reconciliation.
As discussed in Ref. [14], the use of two-mode coherent
attacks against the two-way protocol is not advantageous for
Eve. In fact, using the OFF configuration against such attacks,
Alice and Bob can reach security thresholds which are much
higher than those of one-way protocols. Thus, we consider
here the analysis of collective one-mode attacks, in particular,
those based on entangling cloners, which are the most practi-
cal benchmark to test CV-QKD. We show that, using the ON
configuration against these attacks, Alice and Bob are able
to extract a secret-key in conditions so noisy that any one-
way protocol would fail. In particular, this happens in reverse
reconciliation which turns out to be extremely robust in the
preparation noise, therefore allowing us to improve the per-
formance of CV-QKD in the very noisy regime of infrared
frequencies.
III. CRYPTOANALYSIS OF TWO-WAY THERMAL QKD
Here we study the security performance of the two-way
thermal QKD protocol against collective entangling-cloner at-
tacks. Adopting the ON configuration, we derive the analyt-
ical expressions of the asymptotic secret-key rates (i.e., for
high modulation µ→ +∞), first in DR and then in RR. Such
rates are explicitly plotted in the transmission T for W = 1
(pure-loss channel) and studied in terms of the preparation
noise V0. In the specific case of RR, we also analyze the
behaviour of the security threshold W◭ = W◭(V0, T ) for
different values of T and V0, comparing this threshold with
that of the corresponding one-way thermal protocol.
As shown in Fig. 2, a collective entangling-cloner attack
against the two-way protocol consists of Eve performing two
independent and identical beam-splitter attacks (transmission
T ), one for each use of the channel. For each beam splitter i =
1 or 2, Eve prepares two ancilla modes Ei and E′′i in an EPR
state with variance W . Eve keeps mode E′′i while injecting
the other mode Ei into one port of the beam splitter, leading
to the transmitted mode E′i. These operations are repeated
identically and independently for each signal mode sent by
Bob as well as the return mode sent back to Bob by Alice.
All of Eve’s output modes E′i and E′′i are stored in a quantum
memory which is coherently detected at the end of the two-
way protocol. Eve’s final measurement is optimized based on
Alice and Bob’s classical communication.
For such an attack, Bob’s post-processing of his classical
variables is just given by b = b2−Tb1. This variable is the op-
timal linear estimator of Alice’s variable a in the limit of high
modulationµ→ +∞. Note that this classical post-processing
can be equivalently realized by constructing a displaced mode
B with generic quadrature Bˆ = Bˆ2−Tb1 which is then homo-
dyned by Bob. Despite being useful for the theoretical anal-
ysis of the protocol in RR, such a physical representation is
not practical since it involves the use of a quantum memory to
store mode B2 whose displacement−Tb1 can only be applied
once Bob has estimated the channel transmission T . It is also
important to remark that this equivalent representation is re-
alized by Gaussian operations, so that the global output state
of Bob (B-mode) and Eve (E-modes) is Gaussian (this is true
4for both b1 fixed or Gaussian-modulated).
A. Secret-key rate in direct reconciliation
Let us start our security analysis considering DR [33]. This
type of reconciliation was shown to be very robust for one-
way protocols [12], which were in principle able to tolerate
an infinite amount of preparation noise and still have a finite
secret key, albeit very small [13]. As we show below, such a
behavior is not typical of two-way thermal protocols.
As we know, the secret key rate for DR is given by R◮ :=
I(a : b) − I(a : E). The mutual information between Alice
and Bob is derived from the differential Shannon entropy [34]
and is simply given by
I(a : b) =
1
2
log2
Vb
Vb|a
, (6)
where Vb is the variance of Bob’s post-processed variable b,
and Vb|a its variance conditioned to Alice’s encoding a. These
variances are easy to compute once we write the Bogoliubov
transformations for the quadratures.
The output mode B2 has generic quadrature
Bˆ2 = T Bˆ1 +
√
Ta+
√
1− T (
√
TEˆ1 + Eˆ2) . (7)
Subtracting off the input modulation b1 (known to only Bob),
we get the processed quadrature Bˆ = Bˆ2 − Tb1 equal to
Bˆ = T 0ˆ +
√
Ta+
√
1− T (
√
TEˆ1 + Eˆ2) , (8)
with varianceVB = T 2V0+TVa+(1−T 2)W . Since VB = Vb
and Va = µ, we get
Vb = T
2V0 + Tµ+ (1− T 2)W , (9)
which gives Vb → Tµ in the limit of high modulation.
In the same limit, the conditional variance Vb|a is given by
setting µ = 0 in the previous equation for Vb, i.e., we have
Vb|a = Vb|µ=0 = T 2V0 + (1− T 2)W . (10)
Therefore, the mutual information between Alice and Bob is
given by
I(a : b) =
1
2
log2
T 2V0 + Tµ+ (1− T 2)W
T 2V0 + (1 − T 2)W
→ 1
2
log2
Tµ
T 2V0 + (1− T 2)W . (11)
Eve’s Holevo information on Alice’s encoding variable a is
defined as
I(a : E) := S(E)− S(E|a) , (12)
where S(·) is the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s multimode
output state ρE (modes E′1E′′1E′2E′′2 ) and S(E|a) the entropy
of the conditional state ρE|a for fixed values of Alice’s encod-
ing variable a. Since these states are Gaussian, their entropies
can be computed from the symplectic spectra of their covari-
ance matrices,VE andVE|a, respectively [1].
By generalizing the derivation in Ref. [29] to include the
presence of preparation noise (V0 ≥ 1) we get the following
expression of Eve’s CM for the Gaussian state ρE of modes
E′
1
E′′
1
E′
2
E′′
2
VE(Va, Va) =


εI ϕZ χI 0
ϕZ W I θZ 0
χI θZ ∆(Va, Va) ϕZ
0 0 ϕZ W I

 , (13)
where 0 := diag(0, 0) and the parameters are defined as
ε := (1 − T )VB1 + TW, (14)
χ := −
√
T (1 − T )(W − VB1), (15)
θ := −(1− T )(W 2 − 1), (16)
γ := T (1− T )VB1 + (1− T + T 2)W (17)
ϕ :=
√
T (W 2 − 1), (18)
∆(Va, Va) := γI+ (1− T ) diag(Va, Va) . (19)
In the previous parameters, we set VB1 = V0+µ and Va = µ,
and we consider the limit of high modulation (µ → +∞).
Thus, we are able to compute the asymptotic symplectic spec-
trum of the CM which is given by the four eigenvalues ν1 →
W , ν2 →W and {ν3, ν4} such that ν3ν4 → (1− T )2µ2. Us-
ing these eigenvalues, we compute the entropy of Eve’s state
ρE which is given by [35]
S(E) =
4∑
k=1
h(νk)→ 2h(W )+ log
(e
2
)2
(1−T )2µ2, (20)
where we have used the h-function of Eq. (5) and its asymp-
totic expansion h(x) ≃ log(ex)/2 for large x.
Now we consider the conditional CM VE|a which is given
by VE(0, µ) [29] As a result, VE|a is the same as VE ex-
cept for the adjustment of the variable ∆(µ, µ) → ∆(0, µ).
In the usual limit (µ → +∞) we compute the conditional
spectrum ν¯1 → 1, ν¯2 → W and {ν¯3, ν¯4} such that ν¯3ν¯4 →
(1 − T )
√
(1− T 2)Wµ3. Such eigenvalues allow us to de-
rive the conditional entropy S(E|a) and, therefore, to com-
pute Eve’s Holevo information
I(a : E)→ h(W ) + 1
2
log
(1− T )µ
(1 + T )W
. (21)
Combining Eqs. (11) and (21), we get following asymptotic
expression for the DR secret-key rate
R◮(V0, T,W ) =
1
2
log
T (1 + T )W
(1 − T )(T 2V0 + (1− T 2)W )
− h(W ) (22)
In order to study the performance of the two-way thermal
protocol, we plot in Fig. 3 the DR secret-key rate in the pres-
ence of a pure-loss channel (corresponding to an entangling-
cloner attack with W = 1) as a function of the channel trans-
mission T , and for different values of the preparation noise
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FIG. 3: Plot of the DR secret-key rate of the two-way thermal pro-
tocol for a pure-loss channel (W = 1) as a function of the chan-
nel transsmissivity T , for different values of the preparation noise
V0 = 1, 5, 10 and 100 (from left to right).
V0. As we can see from the figure, two-way quantum commu-
nication with modulated pure states (V0 = 1) is able to beat
the 3 dB loss limit (corresponding to the threshold T = 1/2).
However, as the preparation noise is increased, we see a fairly
rapid deterioration in the security of the protocol. Such a be-
havior is different from what happens in DR for the corre-
sponding one-way thermal protocol [12, 13]. In fact, despite
one-way thermal QKD being secure only within the 3 dB loss
limit, such limit is not affected by the preparation noise V0, so
that high values of V0 are tolerable in the range 0.5 < T < 1
with the DR secret-key rate remaining positive even if close
to zero.
However, contrarily to what happens in DR, we show below
that two-way thermal QKD is very robust to the preparation
noise in RR, such that its security threshold outperforms both
the thresholds (in DR and RR) of the one-way thermal QKD at
any value of the preparation noise V0. This is the feature that
we will exploit to improve the security at the infrared regime.
B. Secret-key rate in reverse reconciliation
Let us derive the RR secret-key rate R◭ := I(a : b) −
I(E : b) [33]. Here we need to compute Eve’s Holevo in-
formation on Bob’s processed variable b, i.e., I(E : b) =
S(E)− S(E|b). From the formula, it is clear that we need to
compute the entropy S(E|b) of Eve’s output state ρE|b condi-
tioned to Bob’s variable b. To compute the CM VE|b of this
state, we first derive the global CM
VEB =
(
VE D
D
T VbI
)
, (23)
describing Eve’s modes E′1E′′1E′2E′′2 , with reduced CM VE
given in Eq. (13), plus Bob’s virtual mode B, with re-
duced CM VbI, with the variance Vb computed in Eq. (9).
Then, we apply homodyne detection on mode B, which pro-
vides [1, 36–38] VE|b = VE − (1/Vb)DΠDT , whereΠ :=
diag(1, 0, 0, 0). Here the off-diagonal block D describes the
correlations between Eve’s and Bob’s modes, and is given by
D
T =
(
ξ1I, φ1Z, ξ2I, φ2Z
)
, (24)
where
ξ1 = −T
√
1− T (V0 −W ), (25)
φ1 =
√
T (1− T )
√
W 2 − 1, (26)
ξ2 = −
√
T (1− T )(TV0 + Va) + TW
√
T (1− T ), (27)
φ2 =
√
1− T
√
W 2 − 1 . (28)
In the previous formulas, we set Va = Vb1 = µ and we con-
sider the limit of high modulation µ→ +∞. In this limit, we
derive the asymptotic expression of the conditional symplectic
spectrum {ν˜1, ν˜2, ν˜3, ν˜4}, which is given by ν˜1 →W ,
ν˜2 →
√
W (1 + T 2V0W + T 3(1− V0W ))
T 2V0 +W + T 3(W − V0) , (29)
and
ν˜3ν˜4 →
√
(1− T )3 (T 2V0 +W + T 3 (W − V0))µ3
T
.
(30)
Using this spectrum we compute the conditional entropy
S(E|b) and, therefore, the RR secret-key rate, whose asymp-
totic expression is equal to
R◭(V0, T,W ) =
1
2
log
T 2V0 +W + T
3 (W − V0)
(V0T 2 + (1− T 2)W ) (1− T )
+ h (ν˜2)− h(W ) (31)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.010
-4
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
T
R¢
FIG. 4: Plot of the RR secret-key rate of the two-way thermal proto-
col for a pure-loss channel (W = 1) as a function of the transmissiv-
ity T for different values of the preparation noise V0 = 1, 5, 10, 100
and 1000 (from top to bottom). As the preparation noise is increased,
the rate decreases but remains positive for any T > 0.
In Fig. 4 we plot the RR secret-key rate R◭ in the presence
of a pure-loss channel (W = 1) as a function of the chan-
nel tranmissivity T for values of the preparation noise from
V0 = 1 to V0 = 10. As we can see, there is no reduction
6in the security of the protocol, in the sense that all the curves
originate from the common threshold T = 0 for any value
of the preparation noise V0, even if the rate is decreasing for
increasing V0. This is clearly in contrast to what happened be-
fore for DR (with the transmission threshold T approaching 1
for high values of V0).
Next, we analyze the security of the two-way thermal pro-
tocol against an arbitrary entangling-cloner attack (with W ≥
1). In Fig. 5, we plot its RR security threshold, expressed as
tolerable excess noise N◭ = N◭(V0, T ) as a function of the
transmissivity T , for a wide range of values of the preparation
noise V0. As we can see, N◭ is very robust with respect to
the preparation noise V0, with all the curves, from V0 = 1 up
to V0 = 106, being included in the region shown in the figure.
Thus, despite the RR secret-key rate R◭ being decreasing for
increasing V0, it remains positive up to the excess noise N◭
shown in Fig. 5. (Furthermore, the threshold value N◭ turns
out to be slightly increasing in V0, as a result of the ‘fighting
noise with noise’ effect of QKD).
From the same figure, we can see that the two-way ther-
mal protocol outperforms the one-way thermal protocol in the
transmission range 0 < T < 1 for any value of the prepara-
tion noise V0 (up to 106). In fact, the one-way protocol is not
robust in RR (see dashed curves in the figure), and its DR se-
curity threshold N◮1-way is well below the two-way RR thresh-
old N◭2-way, apart from a small overlapping region very close
to T = 1. By exploiting this robustness and better perfor-
mance of the two-way thermal protocol, we can improve the
security of CV-QKD at the infrared regime as discussed in the
following section.
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FIG. 5: (Color online). Two-way thermal protocol in the presence of
an arbitrary entangling-cloner attack (W ≥ 1). We plot the RR secu-
rity threshold, expressed as tolerable excess noise N◭ as a function
of the channel transmissivity T for different values of the preparation
noise from V0 = 1 to 106 (illustrated by the shaded regions). This
threshold is compared with the DR threshold of the one-way thermal
protocol for V0 = 1 to 106. The plot also shows the RR threshold of
the one-way protocol (dashed curves) for V0 = 1, 5, 10 (from left to
right).
IV. TWO-WAY THERMAL QKD AT DIFFERENT
WAVELENGTHS
By exploiting its robustness to the preparation noise, we
can use the two-way thermal protocol to improve the security
of CV-QKD at longer wavelengths. Given a bosonic mode
with frequency f in a thermal bath with temperature t, it is
described by a thermal state with mean number of photons
n¯ = [exp(hf/kBt) − 1]−1, where h is Planck’s constant and
kB is Boltzmann’s constant [39]. This number gives the noise-
variance of the thermal state V0 = 2n¯+1, i.e., the preparation
noise, which is therefore function of the frequency and the
temperature, i.e., V0 = V0(f, t). In our study we consider a
fixed value of the temperature t = 15 ◦C, so that V0 is one-to-
one with the frequency f .
Eve’s attack is a collective entangling-cloner attack (as be-
fore) which is thought to be performed inside a cryostat. The
purpose of this is to remove Eve from the background prepa-
ration noise at any wavelength, therefore making her ancillary
modes pure. In order to cover her tracks, Eve uses an entan-
gling cloner with channel noise equal to the preparation noise,
i.e., W = V0. For more information on how to implement an
entangling-cloner attack in thermal QKD, see the details given
in [13].
Thus, at fixed temperature (t = 15 ◦C), we can express
the RR secret-key rate R◭(V0, T,W ) as a function of f and
T , i.e., R◭ = R◭(f, T ). By setting R◭ = 0, we get the
security threshold f◭ = f◭(T ), giving the minimum tolera-
ble frequency f◭ which can be used at any channel transmis-
sion T or, equivalently, the maximum tolerable wavelenght
λ◭ = c/f◭, with c being the speed of light. The threshold
f◭(T ) is plotted in Fig. 6 and compared with the thresholds
of the one-way thermal protocol in DR and RR [12, 13]. As
we can see from the figure, two-way QKD allows us to use
a broader range of frequencies than one-way QKD. In partic-
ular, this happens for 0.2 . T . 0.8, where the two-way
threshold is well below the other thresholds in the infrared
regime.
From Fig. 6, we see a crossing point between the DR and
RR thresholds of the one-way protocol, for T ≃ 0.6 and
f ≃ 1.2 × 1013 Hz. This point identifies the maximum gap
from the two-way configuration, which remains secure for
channel transmissions as low as T ≃ 0.4 at the same crossing
frequency f ≃ 1.2× 1013 Hz. Such a frequency corresponds
to a wavelength of about λ = 24 µm, an infrared region where
quantum communication is very demanding, with free-space
losses around 9.7 dB/m under ideal atmospheric conditions
(with humidity equal to 1mm of water vapor column and tem-
perature of 15 ◦C [40]).
As a result, one-way QKD (T = 0.4) is secure up to a dis-
tance of 22 cm, while two-way QKD (T = 0.6) remains se-
cure up to 41 cm. Despite being a very short distance, this
represents an improvement close to 100%, which could be
extremely useful in short-range cryptography, e.g., for con-
necting close computers through infrared ports or interfacing
mobile devices with ATM machines.
Note that the infrared regime is less challenging in the
10 µm window, for instance at λ = 12 µm. At this wave-
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FIG. 6: Security threshold of the two-way thermal protocol in RR
(a) compared to the security thresholds of the one-way thermal pro-
tocol in DR (b) and RR (c). Thresholds are expressed as minimum
tolerable frequency (or maximum tolerable wavelengths) as a func-
tion of the channel transmission T . Note how the two-way thresh-
old is deeper in the infrared regime. Environmental temperature is
t = 15 ◦C.
length, the atmospheric absorption is dominated by carbon
dioxide, methane, and ozone, with an attenuation which is
much smaller (about 0.53 dB/km). In this case, one-way QKD
is secure up to 14.6 Km, while two-way QKD allows the par-
ties to distribute secret-keys up to 15.8 Km, corresponding to
an 8% improvement in the distance.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have shown how the use of two-way
quantum communication enables two parties to improve the
security of thermal QKD, where (inaccessible) preparation
noise is added to the signal states. Considering both types
of reconciliation procedures (direct and reverse reconcilia-
tion), we have analyzed the secret-key rates and the security
thresholds of a two-way protocol which is based on Gaussian-
modulated thermal states, random Gaussian displacements
and homodyne detections. We have tested its security against
collective Gaussian (entangling-cloner) attacks, showing how
the security threshold in reverse reconciliation is very robust
with respect to the preparation noise, and is able to outperform
the security thresholds (in direct and reverse reconciliation) of
one-way thermal QKD.
Exploiting such a robustness, we have successfully ex-
tended two-way thermal QKD to longer wavelengths, where
thermal background naturally provides very high values of
preparation noise. In particular, we have shown the superiority
of two-way quantum communication in the infrared regime,
improving the security distances which can be reached by the
use of thermal sources at such frequencies.
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Appendix A: Asymptotic secret-key rates for one-way thermal
QKD
In this appendix, we provide the main steps for deriving
the asymptotic secret-key rates of Eqs. (2) and (3), for the
one-way thermal protocol in DR and RR, respectively. These
formulas are the explicit analytical expressions of the key rates
already studied in Refs. [12, 13].
One can easily verify that the CM of Eve’s output modes
E′E′′ is given by
VE =
(
W I
√
T (W 2 − 1)Z√
T (W 2 − 1)Z TW + (1 − T )(Va + V0)I
)
.
(A1)
For large modulation (Va ≫ 1), we can easily compute its
symplectic spectrum [1], which is given by ν1 → W and
ν2 → (1− T )Va. Then, Eve’s entropy is equal to
S(E) = h(ν1) + h(ν2)→ h(W ) + log e
2
(1− T )Va , (A2)
where h(·) is defined in Eq. (5). In the same limit of large
modulation, Eve’s conditional CM VE|a can be computed
from VE by setting Va = 0 for one of the two quadratures.
One can then check that VE|a has the following asymptotic
eigenvalues
ν¯1 →
√
WΛ(1,WV0)
Λ(W,V0)
, ν¯2 →
√
(1− T )Λ(W,V0)Va ,
(A3)
where the function Λ(x, y) is defined in Eq. (4). As a result,
Eve’s conditional entropy is given by
S(E|a)→ h(ν¯1) + log e
2
√
(1− T )Λ(W,V0)Va . (A4)
Combining Eqs. (A2) and (A4), we get Eve’s Holevo infor-
mation
I(E : a) = S(E)− S(E|a)
→ h(W )− h(ν¯1) + 1
2
log
(1− T )Va
Λ(W,V0)
. (A5)
Very easily, we can also compute Alice and Bob’s mutual
information, which is given by
I(a : b) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
TVa
Λ(V0,W )
]
. (A6)
Using Eqs. (A5) and (A6), we derive the asymptotic secret-
key rate in DR, equal to Eq. (2).
8Let us now compute the key rate in RR. Note that Eve and
Bob’s joint CM is given by
VEB =
(
VE C
C
T
B
)
, (A7)
whereB = [Λ(V0,W ) + TVa]I, and
C =
( √
(1− T )(W 2 − 1)Z√
T (1− T )[W − (Va + V0)]I
)
. (A8)
As a result of Bob’s homodyne detection, Eve’s conditional
CM is given by VE|b = VE − C(ΠBΠ)−1CT , with Π :=
diag(1, 0) [1, 36–38]. For large modulation, this CM has
asymptotic spectrum ν˜1 → 1, and
ν˜2 →
√
1− T
T
WVa , (A9)
so that Eve’s conditional entropy is given by
S(E|b)→ log e
2
√
1− T
T
WVa . (A10)
Using the expressions for S(E) and I(a : b) previously com-
puted, we can derive the asymptotic secret-key rate in RR
which is given in Eq. (3).
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